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Introduction

It is often difficult to engage in critical discussions of
fundamental democratic principles. Basic questions of
democratic praxis are assumed to be easily answered or
are thought to have been answered declaratively by the
“founding fathers.” Thus, the question of how we ought
to go about enacting systems of governance by, for, and
of the people seems to have a simple answer: majoritarianism. Decision making, according to the will of the
majority, appeals to a sense of fairness. Majoritarianism
was a radical aspect of modern democratic revolutions.
Ancient Greek elite philosophers such as Plato and
Aristotle connected the dangers and instability of democracy to its base in mob rule, or rule by the majority
class. The colonists, in what was to become the United
States, strove to break away from rule by a minority
aristocratic regime. (U.S.) Americans have, thus, grown
to believe fervently in majoritarianism as the core of
their democratic ideals.
More recently, many minorities and allies have begun
to question a democratic system organized structurally
to guarantee that the majority always wins. U.S.
Supreme Court Justice Brennan wrote that “in pluralistic societies such as ours, institutions dominated by a
majority are inevitably, if inadvertently, insensitive to
the needs and values of minorities when these needs
and values differ from those of the majority.” One can
argue that strict proponents of majoritarianism are being, rather than democratic, too often anti-democratic.
A strict interpretation of majority rule as the foundational answer to the “how” question of democratic
practice tends to serve and protect the interests of those
already privileged.
We thus must remember why majoritarianism was at
times considered a radical technique of democracy, and
therefore, or perhaps even more importantly, that it is
a technique of democracy and not to be simply equated
with democracy itself. The practice must serve the principle. If there are times when democracy will be better
served by other means, then we ought to employ those
other means. In fact, popular rhetoric in the United

States notwithstanding, democratic theorists have long
questioned majority rule, myriad institutions, and governing bodies, and organizations in democracies have
employed methods that run counter to the majoritarian principle, specifically in the interest of promoting
democratic egalitarianism.

Madison’s Majoritarianism

Many consider majoritarianism to be a founding U.S.
principle and, therefore, attribute it to James Madison.
Madison, however, was neither a democrat nor a majoritarian precisely, because he sought to promote minority
elite interests. In Federalist 10, Madison tells us that he
knows what a democracy is…and he is not interested.
Instead, he argues for a republic. As described in
Federalist 10, democracies are smaller, with more people
participating, and are less guided by the rights of individual property. Republics can be larger, relying on
representation of the people, and are better protectors of
property.
Madison can be confusing for contemporary (U.S.)
Americans because: 1) he was a thinker afraid of both
minority rule and majority abuse, 2) he devised a
system to protect minorities but used a version of
majoritarianism to do so, 3) he did none of this in the
service of democracy. His method is less straightforward, therefore, than it might first appear. One of the
central benefits of a republic is that, relying on representation, it has the capacity to cover large geographical
distances. This was essential to Madison as he knew that
differences “are sown in the nature of man” and that
the more diverse the geographical landscape, the more
diverse the people. Madison thought that by structurally encouraging diversity in a vast geographical area, it
would be almost impossible for any one idea or interest
to be taken up by a majority. Although he designed the
system to utilize a winner-take-all style of majority rule
voting, the winning party would, of necessity, always be
constituted by a temporary coalition of minorities. Due
to the diversity structurally secured, Madison felt it was
unlikely that any two issues would attract the same con-
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figuration of minorities for and against. Thus, afraid of
the tyrannical potential of majorities, Madison utilized
a specific form of majority rule as a mechanism to prevent their formation and sustenance.
The persuasiveness of Madison’s theory for democratic thinkers rests on the assumption that there are
numerous and shifting factional interests and the dimension of time. Madison’s logic suggests that each of
us will find ourselves in the minority at some points,
but not permanently. Similarly, no one group will persistently win political battles, nor will any lose so often
that they are effectively disenfranchised. In a nation of
myriad minority groups, your group might lose on this
turn in politics, but the system remains fair and democratic, because it is sure that you will win in another
turn. Losers are soothed by the promise of time.

Canonical Theorists and the U.S.
Experiment

In On Liberty, British political theorist John Stuart Mill
writes that “in political and philosophical theories as
well as in persons, success discloses faults and infirmities which failure might have concealed from observation” (1984,61). Writing almost a century after the (U.S.)
American Revolution, Mill looks back on this democratic experiment in practice, and he must face some of
the “faults and infirmities,” which have transpired since
the actualization of the grand theoretical proposal.
He tells us that “self-government and the power of the
people over themselves” have not exactly turned out
to be true. In a government “of each by all the rest,” he
considers “the will of the people, moreover, practically
means the will of the most numerous or the most active
part of the people—the majority, or those who succeed
in making themselves accepted as the majority; the people, consequently, may desire to oppress a part of their
number, and precautions are as much needed against
this as against any other abuse of power” (1984,62).
We find a similar wariness on the part of de Tocqueville. De Tocqueville was a Frenchman who came
to the United States in the 1800s to study the new form
of democracy developing here. He was impressed in
many ways with what he saw. But he also noticed something unusual. In its own ways, majority practices had
so come to dominate U.S. culture that de Tocqueville
thought the U.S. form of democracy had created a form
of majority tyranny as yet unseen in any despotic form
of government.

U.S. Democratic Theorists

In the contemporary U. S. context, scholars such as
Schattschneider have also taken issue with the Madisonian formulation as a democratic formulation. He
argues that there is an inherent class bias in understanding our system as made up of an array of groups
competing in the political marketplace. Looking
through another lens of diversity, Feldman argues that
the freedom of religion clause found in the Bill of Rights
served to bolster and protect majority Christian hegemony at the expense of non-Christian minorities. What
is often seen as diversity protected by these clauses is
merely a multiplicity of groups belonging to the dominant Christian majority.
One of the major thinkers exposing the gaps in
the U.S. reliance on majoritarianism for a democracy
characterized with tremendous racial diversity is Lani
Guinier. Early in his first term, President Clinton nominated Guinier for the position of Civil Rights Enforcement Chief. Within a few months—marked by great
dissension—though, Clinton withdrew his nomination.
At the heart of the controversy were Guinier’s legal
writings on race, which analyzed the relationship between democratic values and (U.S.) American one-person-one-vote, winner-take-all majority rule. The roots
of her ideas may be found in early, second-wave feminist
concerns with democratic praxis. The anti-democratic
manifestations of Madisonian style majoritarianism not
only kept certain minorities disenfranchised, but also
women, a numerical majority of the population. Since
Mill, we have seen that in this system certain groups
can “succeed in making themselves accepted as the majority.” Feminists and queer theorists and activists clarified the limitations in a majority rule system that can legally over-rule disempowered minority group concerns,
such as those emerging from LBGT communities, while
also protecting already enfranchised minorities (e.g.,
men) over and against numerical, though disenfranchised, majorities (e.g., women).
In sum, we may note that one of the central flaws in
the founders’ majoritarianism is that in a heterogeneous
society with relatively permanent minorities, certain
groups will continuously end up on the outside. Our
experiences in a country where minorities bear the
brunt of the failures of liberal democracy illuminate
how the consequences of substituting majoritarianism
for democracy are fatal. Replacing the principled goal
of democracy with a particular strategy for running
institutions has enabled—sometimes even well-meaning—people to use a culturally and historically specific
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procedural method for anti-democratic purposes (i.e.,
the continued exclusion of many minorities). As the
historical experiences of Jews, queers, women, Japanese,
and African-Americans have demonstrated, minorities can be consistently ignored through perfectly legal
means when the technique of majoritarianism is substituted for the principle of democracy.
This contribution to the UNH Discovery Program is adapted from Marla
Brettschneider’s Democratic Theorizing From the Margins. 2002. Philadelphia:
Temple University Press, Chapter 7.
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